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The Malthouse Compromise 
By Dr Graham Gudgin, Research Associate at the Centre For 
Business Research Judge Business school University of 
Cambridge and Chief Economic Advisor at the Policy Exchange 
think-tank London. 
The recent vote in parliament attempting to prevent a no-deal 
outcome on Brexit was counter-productive and non-binding. Any 
attempt to hobble the government’s negotiating hand would have 
been a self-inflicted wound. It was also irrelevant, since virtually no-
one in the UK is advocating no deal. The preference of the European 
Research Group (ERG) of Conservative Eurosceptic MPs has always 
been for what is usually called a ‘Canada-plus’ free trade agreement. 
Everyone also supports sensible side deals on such issues as aircraft 
landing rights, air and vehicle safety certification, and trucker’s 
licences. It may not be the Withdrawal Agreement signed off by 
Theresa May, but it is a perfectly coherent UK offer, especially if 
accompanied by undertakings on the Irish border. 
It is entirely logical for Brussels to play hardball at this stage of the 
talks. The EU still sees some prospect of Parliament reversing its 
rejection of the Withdrawal Agreement and is, of course, fully aware of 
the non-binding vote on no deal. However, the EU’s current refusal to 
re-open the Withdrawal Agreement is unlikely to be a guide to the 
endgame in March. 
It would nevertheless be logical for the EU to offer Parliament a 
sweetener in the form of a codicil attached to the Withdrawal 
Agreement. This codicil could suggest that the EU will try hard to 
ensure that the backstop is either never used or will be used for only a 
short period (where the EU has done similar things in the past). 
However, this is unlikely to work since prominent ERG MPs have said 
that they will reject any formulation that does not replace the current 
wording of the Withdrawal Agreement with a clear get-out clause from 
the backstop. The likelihood is thus that the deal will once again be 
rejected if it returns to parliament. 
The prime minister’s first preference is clearly still to get an amended 
Withdrawal Agreement through parliament. Her strategy all along has 
been to give Leave supporters a formal exit from the EU and  control 
over EU migration, but to give companies an outcome very close to 
the customs union and single market. The recent Nissan decision not 
to build the new X-Trail model in the UK will have strengthened this 
resolve. 
The voting strength of the ERG, however, means that a fall-back 
position is now under consideration – the ‘Malthouse Compromise’. 
This is close to the ERG’s longstanding preferred option, with the 
involvement of prominent Remainers giving the plan a far higher 
profile than we might otherwise have expected. These MPs find the 
Withdrawal Agreement unacceptable. They also share a survival 
instinct and wish to prevent their party from fracturing and losing the 
next election. If and when the Withdrawal Agreement fails again to 
pass in Parliament, the plan is to have a compromise which the 
Malthouse group hope will command sufficient Tory and DUP support 
(together with up to forty Labour MPs from leave-voting 
constituencies) to provide majority backing in parliament. This can 
then be presented to the EU who will need to choose between this 
and no deal. 
The Malthouse Compromise is based on a free-trade agreement with 
no tariffs or quotas. A commitment to avoid new infrastructure on the 
Irish border is supported by proposals for advanced customs and 
trade facilitation measures of the sort already in use on, for instance, 
the Swiss border. Regulatory equivalence of the type that currently 
exists for meat imports from New Zealand are proposed to remove the 
need for sanitary and phytosanitary checks for food and animal 
imports. Non-regression clauses of the sort common in modern free 
trade agreements are proposed to address EU concerns over unfair 
competition. Provisions on citizen’s rights and payments to the EU 
would be carried forward from the Withdrawal Agreement. 
The Malthouse plan could involve an extended transition period 
agreed under article 50 to allow time to negotiate a free-trade 
agreement (which should not be difficult between two entities which 
already have free trade). Additional payments would accompany an 
extended period. Alternatively, the free trade negotiation could be 
conducted without a formal transition period through making use of 
the provisions of GATT Article 24 as long as the EU agreed that 
formal FTA talks could begin soon after March 29th. Article 24 allows 
countries engaged in formal free trade negotiations to suspend the 
most favoured nation rule of the WTO and to continue with the 
existing tariff-free trade arrangements. In either case, the period 
would finish by December 2021 at the latest. 
The EU is likely to resist consideration of this alternative for several 
weeks, but once the Withdrawal Agreement has sunk without trace, 
and both sides face no deal, there are three strong reasons why it 
might accept the Malthouse Compromise. First, an agreement 
secures the £39 billion (or more) promised in the Withdrawal 
Agreement. Secondly, an agreement avoids potentially high tariffs for 
EU exporters into the EU. The EU currently sells £55 billion of 
products in high-tariff food and vehicle sectors into the UK. Exports 
from the UK into the EU in these sectors are lower at £21 billion. 
But the most pressing reason is to secure a frictionless border in 
Ireland. The UK has guaranteed no new border infrastructure, deal or 
no deal, but without a deal there will be a problem on the Irish side to 
maintain the integrity of the EU single market. It is obviously better for 
Ireland and the EU to accept some deal on the Irish border rather than 
no deal at all, even if that deal were inferior to the backstop in their 
eyes. The UK will also prefer to avoid no deal but can live with tariffs 
and side deals. 
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